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Timers on Ventilators
Abstract
Is there a distinction between withholding and withdrawing medical treatment at the end of life? In the
past two decades, courts and bioethicists in most Western countries have rejected this distinction.
However, some doctors, patients, and families still find the distinction to have important ethical
implications. A proposed Israeli law offers a unique approach that attempts to respect the cultural
reluctance to withdraw treatment while finding a practical solution that respects the wishes of patients
and families and allows patients to end their lives with dignity. The Israeli case offers important insights
for other countries that want to combine their cultural identity and heritage with democratic and liberal
values as well as for doctors in Western countries caring for patients and families that espouse different
communal cultural traditions.
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Timers on ventilators
Vardit Ravitsky
Jewish religious law considers human intervention to end the life of dying patients unethical. Timers
on ventilators are proposed as a solution to prevent unnecessary suffering

Objections to withdrawing treatment
The standard Western response to the reluctance of
doctors and families to withdraw care is to dismiss it as
an emotional reaction. The solution offered is to
employ rational reasoning and not be misled by the
apparent distinction.2 This approach is difficult for
individuals or cultures who take the distinction
seriously. Israel is a case in point. Although in many
ways Israel is part of the Western medical world, it
“Deviates considerably from Western norms in certain
fundamental respects.”3 Israel defines itself as a “Jewish
and democratic state” and attempts to integrate a
liberal democracy with a Jewish communitarian
approach.
Israel does not share the strong Western, especially
Anglo-American, consensus regarding the over-riding
ethical priority accorded to individual autonomy.
Traditional values that Judaism shares with other
religions are also at play. These place an enormous
emphasis on the value of human life up until the
moment of death and on the religious notion of life as
belonging to the creator and not to people.
Hence, the Western liberal emphasis on autonomy
does not always prevail. Rather, the “communitarian
dialogue pushes . . . to alter the individual’s preferences
to better harmonize with the collective voice.”4 In Israel,
this collective voice is shaped by a religious heritage
that is partly based on values stemming from Jewish
religious law, called Halakha. The rich and diverse
Halakhic literature encompasses more than 18
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centuries of intellectual discourse about most aspects
of human life, including bioethics.

A Jewish perspective
Within Halakhic literature, withholding treatment at
the end of life, generally perceived as a permitted noninterference in the natural process of dying, is
traditionally distinguished from interventions involving direct contact with the body or immediate environment of the dying person—for example, the withdrawal
of treatment that has already started.5 This distinction
stems at least in part from the religious approach that
humans should not have an active role in the dying
process, which should remain in the hands of God.
Jewish religious law does not approach the issue from
a consequentialist perspective, where the moral value
inheres only in the end result. Rather, the procedure
leading to the outcome has independent moral value.
The Halakhic literature reasons using a metaphor
of the dying person as a “flickering candle,” and the
idea that one should not be “placing one’s finger on the
candle.” In his book Alternatives in Jewish Bioethics,
Noam Zohar notes that “this clearly excludes an
understanding of the forbidden hastening of death in
consequentialist terms: the deed’s wrongness is not
determined by its result—namely, the fact that the
patient is dead at a certain earlier moment—but rather
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Is there a distinction between withholding and
withdrawing medical treatment at the end of life? In
the past two decades, courts and bioethicists in most
Western countries have rejected this distinction.1 However, some doctors, patients, and families still find the
distinction to have important ethical implications. A
proposed Israeli law offers a unique approach that
attempts to respect the cultural reluctance to withdraw
treatment while finding a practical solution that
respects the wishes of patients and families and allows
patients to end their lives with dignity. The Israeli case
offers important insights for other countries that want
to combine their cultural identity and heritage with
democratic and liberal values as well as for doctors in
Western countries caring for patients and families that
espouse different communal cultural traditions.

Under Halakhic law dying patients cannot be disconnected from a ventilator
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by its symbolic characterisation as extinguishing the
candle.”6 This means that withdrawal of treatment is
perceived as forbidden even if the death of the patient
at that point in time is an ethically appropriate
outcome.
In this cultural context withholding is acceptable
but withdrawing is not.7 Consequently, an individual’s
request to withdraw life sustaining treatment, such as
mechanical ventilation, is perceived by many as
conflicting with this traditional approach. Patients may
request not to be connected to a ventilator, but they
cannot ask to be disconnected once treatment has
been initiated. This approach delineates limits imposed
even on the autonomy of competent adult patients.
Israel thus faces the challenge of respecting personal
autonomy and the right of individuals to choose how
and when to end their lives, while taking into
consideration traditional values that sometimes
demand limits on these choices.

Regulating end of life treatment
End of life care in Israel is currently not regulated by
legislation. To develop a coherent policy and formulate
guidelines, Israel’s Minister of Health established in
2000 a public committee on the dying patient.8 The
committee, chaired by Professor Avraham Steinberg,
reflected professional expertise and included representatives of most Jewish denominations, as well as the
larger minority groups within Israeli society. Other
than a few dissenting opinions, a wide consensus was
reached among all groups, and a proposal submitted
to the health minister in 2002. This has been approved
by the Israeli ministerial committee for legislation and
is currently being sent to the Knesset (the Israeli parliament) as a governmental proposal for legislation.
In reaching a solution, the committee tried to harmonise the Jewish cultural heritage with the autonomy
of a dying patient. The philosophical subcommittee,
chaired by Professor Asa Kasher, suggested a
distinction between continuous and discrete treatment
as a way of translating the traditional distinction
between withdrawing and withholding into clearly
defined terms. According to the proposal, “not
continuing discrete treatment” is perceived as withholding, whereas “not continuing continuous treatment” is perceived as withdrawing.
The proposed law defines continuous treatment as
“any form of treatment that is essentially uninterrupted
and admits of no clear distinction between the end of
one cycle and the beginning of another,” and discrete
treatment as “treatment that begins and ends in
well-defined cycles.” Mechanical ventilation is an
example of continuous treatment, while blood transfusions, dialysis, or drug treatment are examples of
discrete treatment.
According to the proposed law “it is forbidden to
terminate continuous medical treatment . . . when the
termination may lead to the death of the patient,
whether competent or not competent. However, it is
permitted to terminate discrete treatment.”9 Patients
may therefore request not to renew discrete treatment,
but they cannot request to withdraw continuous treatment, such as mechanical ventilation.
The disturbing result may be that patients will
remain connected to ventilators against their will. This
416

presents extreme difficulties. Firstly, as a matter of
principle, it would restrict the range of choices
individuals have unfettered control over. Secondly, it
might cause patients to refuse the intervention for fear
of being trapped in a cycle of suffering against their
will, thus shortening their lives unnecessarily. Thirdly,
since the need to connect a patient to a ventilator is
sometimes urgent and unexpected, decisions would be
made in haste, without appropriate discussion among
family members. Healthcare providers may also be
reluctant to start ventilation, knowing that once
initiated it cannot be withdrawn.

Permitting termination of continuous
care
The committee thus sought a solution that would
resolve the tension between the demands of individual
autonomy and those of Israeli communitarian values
that echo the Halakhic approach. Instead of attempting
to “educate” the medical community and the public to
disregard the distinction between withholding and
withdrawing treatment, committee members opted to
devise a technical solution. Since the main practical
issue is that of withdrawing mechanical ventilation,
they came up with the idea of transforming the
continuous into discrete by installing timers on ventilators, with the assumption that “not renewing treatment
that has been interrupted can be defined as withholding treatment.”10
A second committee was established with the goal
of developing delayed response timers. These will allow
a ventilator to be set for a limited time (such as a week),
at the end of which it will be turned off without human
intervention. This would allow time for appropriate
discussion among patients, family members, and
healthcare providers. The discussion may result in a
decision to extend the operation of the ventilator for a
time determined by medical need or by the wishes of
the patient or the family, or in a decision to let it turn
off at the set time, providing the patient is under
appropriate sedation. Such timers are being developed, but before they are put into clinical use their
safety will have to be tested in an ethically approved
clinical trial.
Timers have been in use for decades as a technical
solution to reconcile centuries of Halakhic law with the
use of modern technologies. For example, according
to orthodox Halakha, turning electric devices on and
off is forbidden during the Jewish Sabbath. Orthodox
Jews use timers to regulate operation of electric
devices in advance, thus preventing the need for active
intervention.

Bioethical analysis
What is the bioethical meaning of this proposed solution? If the reluctance to disconnect a patient from a
ventilator is based on the belief that the act is ethically
wrong, timers could be perceived as deceptive devices
meant to disguise an unethical act as a legitimate one.
In such a case, a mechanical device that transforms
what is in essence withdrawal into what externally
looks like withholding has controversial ethical
implications. Do timers represent the “displacement of
ethics by trickery?”11 Will they enable Israeli physicians
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Summary points
Jewish tradition maintains a distinction between
withholding and withdrawing treatment at the
end of life
Any intervention to hasten death is viewed as
unethical even if the outcome is ethically
desirable
A proposed Israeli law suggests the installation of
timers on ventilators as a way of respecting
cultural and religious reluctance to withdraw life
sustaining treatment
This pragmatic solution would enable doctors to
honour the wishes of patients and families to stop
mechanical ventilation

to perform in practice what their principles otherwise
forbid them from doing, thus eroding a well founded
ethical intuition and encouraging wrongdoing?
Timers are not a ruse to an unethical outcome.
According to Jewish religious law, even if the outcome
is ethically desirable, the procedure leading to it may
still be forbidden. Hence, the termination of continuous treatment is perceived as ethically prohibited not
because it leads to an ethically wrong outcome but
because it uses an ethically questionable procedure to
achieve that outcome, as in the case of using tainted
evidence to achieve a justified conviction. The difficulty
of accepting withdrawal is not based on a belief that the
life of a suffering dying patient should be prolonged at
all costs but on a cultural approach that is ethically
opposed to human intervention to terminate life.
Consequently, creating an alternative procedure
allows the Halakhic legislator to overcome the obstacle
and proceed towards achieving the desirable outcome.
Finding an alternative procedure to a desirable
outcome is a typical Halakhic approach. It allows adaptation to changing circumstances without requiring the
Halakhic legislator to contradict legal principles or
precedents.

By converting “commissions into omissions,”11
timers are meant to enable healthcare providers to
overcome a procedural obstacle to achieve an ethically
justified outcome. Moreover, they may allow them to
overcome a possible emotional difficulty of terminating life supporting treatment. They also enable people
with diverse attitudes and values to reach a suitable
pragmatic consensus. Timers should therefore be perceived as an appropriate way of bridging the gap
between the ethically justified outcomes of respect for
individual autonomy, avoidance of prolonged suffering, and death with dignity, on the one hand, and communitarian cultural values on the other.
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One hundred years ago
The puffing paragraph
One of the most frequent of the manifold complaints which
are poured into the editorial ear is of the appearance in
newspapers of biographical notices of medical practitioners or
records of their achievements. The puffing paragraph with which
the new journalism has made us too familiar is always
objectionable, but in the case of medical men it is often
something worse, for it may be false as well as fulsome. In this
way it may be misleading to the public as well as harmful to the
practitioner, who is made ridiculous by inappropriate praise.
There is nothing, indeed, that makes the judicious grieve more
than maladroit flattery, which is as embarrassing to the victim as
the clumsy caresses of the horse in the fable who tried to
emulate the dog’s gambols about his master. It may be assumed,
on the low but solid ground of enlightened self-interest, that as a
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rule puffing paragraphs concerning medical practitioners are
not inspired by them. Newspapers cannot, as long as the law of
libel is not infringed, be prevented from giving information
which is considered likely to interest their readers. What, then, is
to be done by the doctor on whom a too friendly editor persists
in turning the limelight? In a recent issue we mentioned that an
American physician had proceeded against a newspaper which
had puffed him for injury caused by what may be termed an
inverted libel.
Any man may be puffed once or even twice without his
knowledge, or even against his will. But if his name constantly
appears in the papers he may find it difficult to satisfy his
brethren that he is the innocent victim of a malign combination
of circumstances. (BMJ 1905;i:87)
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